Bangladesh-Pakistan relations: Reassessing the past, reimagining the future

On Saturday, Pakistan's Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign
Minister Ishaq Dar arrived in Dhaka for a two-day bilateral mission. His visit
overlaps with that of Commerce Minister Jam Kamal Khan, who arrived on a
four-day trip on August 21. During these high-level engagements, Dhaka and
Islamabad are expected to sign several agreements, including provisions for
visa-free travel for diplomatic and official passport holders, cooperation
between their respective Foreign Service Academies, and the establishment of a
Joint Working Group under the two commerce ministries. Other possible
instruments include the renewal of a cultural exchange memorandum of
understanding (MoU) and a media cooperation agreement between the Bangladesh
Press Institute and the Associated Press of Pakistan.
The countries'
two foreign ministers are scheduled to meet on Sunday, August 24, followed by a
formal signing ceremony. Later that afternoon, Ishaq Dar is expected to pay a
courtesy call on Chief Adviser Muhammad Yunus. These meetings and agreements,
blending trade diplomacy with cultural and institutional cooperation, represent
more than ceremonial symbolism. They mark a deliberate attempt to reset
bilateral relations on a broader foundation encompassing political, economic,
and social dimensions. For two countries bound by a turbulent and intertwined
history, this moment offers an opportunity to revisit the past, recalibrate the
present, and reimagine the future.
The timing of the visits could not be more significant.
Bangladesh is currently governed by an interim administration led by Muhammad
Yunus, whose declared policy of "friendship to all" marks a sharp
departure from Awami League's India-centric diplomacy. In less than a year,
Dhaka and Islamabad have re-established high-level communication, revitalised
economic ties, and even begun to explore nascent military cooperation.
Yet history
cannot be set aside so easily. For Bangladesh, the legacy of the 1971
Liberation War remains etched into its national consciousness. For Pakistan,
sensitivities surrounding a formal acknowledgement of its wartime atrocities
persist, with Islamabad continuing to view the 1974 Tripartite Agreement (with
India being the third party) as a final settlement. This unresolved discord is
both a visible obstacle and the defining backdrop to any future rapprochement.
During Sheikh
Hasina's premiership, relations between Bangladesh and Pakistan remained deeply
strained for much of her 15 years of rule. The establishment of the
International Crimes Tribunal in 2009 to prosecute 1971 war crimes and the
subsequent execution of several Jamaat-e-Islami leaders drew sharp condemnation
from Pakistan, which dismissed the trials as politically motivated. Dhaka's
consistent demand for a formal apology further fuelled tensions. Awami League
also actively leveraged anti-Pakistan rhetoric as a tool of domestic
legitimacy, in sharp contrast to Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), which
historically maintained more cordial ties with Islamabad.
The August 2024
changeover brought an immediate shift in tone. Within months, Prime Minister
Shehbaz Sharif and Chief Adviser Yunus met on the sidelines of the UN General
Assembly and the D-8 Summit, signalling a mutual intent to reset ties. Tangible
progress soon followed. Bilateral trade surged by 20 percent in the 2024-25
fiscal year, rising from approximately USD 712 million to USD 865 million.
Direct sea trade resumed in November 2024, marking the end of a hiatus of over
half a century. An MoU on rice procurement was signed in January 2025, while
Pakistan's budget airline, Fly Jinnah, received approval to operate flights to
Dhaka. Military contacts also resumed, with discussions on joint exercises and
training.
Even so, the
warming of relations does not obscure the formidable challenges that lie ahead.
The unresolved legacy of 1971 continues to loom large, with the demand for a
formal apology from Pakistan retaining powerful symbolic weight in Bangladesh's
political discourse. While the interim government may emphasise pragmatic
cooperation, public sentiment shaped by decades of historical memory cannot be
ignored. At the same time, perceptions in some quarters that rapprochement with
Pakistan signals a zero-sum departure from India risk fuelling polarisation at
home. Security sensitivities add another layer of complexity: discussions on
acquiring Chinese-built JF-17 fighter jets or participating in Pakistan-led
naval exercises could concern India. On the economic front, diversification is
strategically wise, but both countries have historically had low trade volumes
and narrow complementarities, raising the possibility that political symbolism
may outpace substance unless supported by targeted agreements and enhanced
connectivity.
Nevertheless,
genuine prospects for building a balanced and mutually beneficial partnership
lie within these constraints. Reopening direct maritime routes creates
opportunities to reduce costs and improve competitiveness. The Joint Business
Council, if expanded to include small enterprises, digital platforms, and
textiles, could help push bilateral trade towards the ambitious target of $3
billion. Pakistan's offer of 300 fully funded scholarships for Bangladeshi
students and expanded cultural and academic exchanges can slowly erode mistrust
at the societal level. Enhanced ties with Pakistan also need not be seen as
antagonistic to India; instead, they can serve as a pragmatic balancing tool in
a multipolar South Asia. Even in the sensitive defence sphere, carefully
calibrated cooperation in non-offensive areas such as UN peacekeeping, disaster
relief, or counterterrorism intelligence sharing could deliver tangible
benefits without alarming regional actors. The task, therefore, is not to erase
history but to build a forward-looking partnership that is proportionate,
transparent, and grounded in national interest.
India's
perspective inevitably looms over these developments. For New Delhi, Bangladesh
has long been a vital partner in ensuring stability along its north-eastern
frontier, and the Awami League era witnessed unprecedented strategic alignment.
The cooling of Dhaka-Delhi relations since 2024, coupled with Bangladesh's
renewed engagement with Pakistan, has raised concerns of a possible
China-Pakistan-Bangladesh axis for our giant neighbour. India's likely
responses include the imposition of non-tariff barriers and import restrictions
on Bangladeshi goods, a broader diplomatic recalibration to engage with a wider
array of Bangladeshi actors, and security signalling to discourage deep
military cooperation with Pakistan. For Dhaka, the challenge will be to demonstrate
that engagement with Pakistan complements rather than undermines its
relationship with India.
Reimagining the
future of Bangladesh-Pakistan relations requires a change in mindset on both
sides. For Bangladesh, this means acknowledging that while the past cannot be
erased, the future can be shaped by pragmatic interests and mutual respect. For
Pakistan, it requires recognising that symbolic and meaningful gestures can
build trust and goodwill. Practical steps could include joint historical
research initiatives, sector-specific trade agreements in areas such as
pharmaceuticals, information technology, and textiles, annual foreign
secretary-level dialogues to ensure continuity beyond political cycles, and
expanded parliamentary exchanges to include opposition parties, thereby
broadening the constituency for improved ties.
The visits of
Ishaq Dar and Jam Kamal Khan offer both symbolic and strategic openings.
Whether this becomes a milestone or a missed opportunity will depend on how
both nations navigate the interplay of history, politics, and pragmatism.
Bangladesh and Pakistan now stand at a diplomatic crossroads. The path forward
will require patience, mutual sensitivity, and a focus on shared interests. A
working relationship will be a gradual process, requiring sustained commitment
from governments and societies alike. The ultimate goal should not be to erase
the past, but to ensure that it does not imprison the future. That may be the
most constructive way forward for two nations with intertwined destinies in an
evolving South Asia.
Professor Sk Tawfique M Haque is director at the South Asian
Institute of Policy and Governance (SIPG), North South University. He can be
reached at tawfique.haque@northsouth.edu.
Md. Parvez Hasan Yousuf is a research associate at SIPG, North
South University. He can be reached at parvez.yousuf@northsouth.edu.
















